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The existence of large hunting/shooting communities across Europe is sufficiently 
widespread that hunters can be classed as a distinct social group or subculture. 
Hunters are nevertheless  not legally recognized as a distinct protected group even 
where they are granted considerable recognition within legislative and policy 
discourse related to their interests. Widespread opposition to anti-hunting legislation 
across Europe suggests a shared resistance to legislation and public policy detrimental 
to their ‘sport’ among hunters and those engaged in animal harm linked to traditional 
fieldsports and activities such as illegal predator control linked to hunting interests 
[1,2]. Environmental politics discourse suggests that laws gain legitimacy through 
public acceptance and engagement with the views of those negatively impacted upon 
by prohibitive legislation, sometimes necessitating increased public discourse [3,4].  
Socio-legal discourse, however, suggests that states have not only a right, but 
sometimes an actual obligation, to introduce laws that serve a utilitarian purpose; even 
where these marginalise certain interest groups, e.g. hunters [5-7].  Thus both wildlife 
trust and public good doctrines are employed to introduce and maintain wildlife 
protection laws that outlaw (traditional) hunting activities where wildlife protection 
priorities exist [5,8].   
 
This article examines these conflicts through analysis of the UK’s Hunting Act 
2004 and challenges to its introduction via European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)  
action; particularly arguments that hunting falls within Article 8 (right to a private 
life) Article 11 (freedom of association/assembly) and Article 14 (freedom from 
discrimination).  The ECtHR’s jurisprudence, via examination of various challenges 
to anti-hunting legislation, concludes that hunting is an activity that is only protected 
by human rights law in specific circumstances. It also determines that the hunting 
community does not represent a distinct ethnic or national minority, nor does the 
activity of hunting represent a particular lifestyle considered to be indispensable for 
personal or cultural identity (except in respect of aboriginal or indigenous peoples' 
subsistence hunting activity). Accordingly, employing a green criminological 
perspective, this article concludes that European states are entitled to regulate or 
criminalize hunting where they consider there are legitimate animal protection or 
moral reasons to do so, even in the face of significant opposition from hunting 
communities.  This being the case, continued resistance to lawful hunting restrictions 
through illegal hunting can be considered as mainstream criminality subject to 
criminal justice attention rather than as legitimate resistance.
1
 In accordance with 
green criminological perspectives of species justice [9,10] those engaged in illegal 
hunting, even with the tacit support of their communities can arguably be treated as 
members of a deviant subculture. Cooper [11] for example, notes that 'those who hunt 
with dogs are properly referred to as 'offenders' and also refers to 'the institutionalized 
                                                 
1
 Although the article notes that a range of different hunting practices and cultures exist across Europe 
and that the UK experience at the centre of this article differs from other hunting cultures. The article 
discusses these differences while noting that the ECtHR takes a European view not one that applies 
solely to the UK context. 
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ethos of violence that hunting can represent, and its possible contribution to a wider 
abusive culture'.  This conception is reflected in the views of judges considering the 
legal challenges discussed within this article and within legal systems that make 
distinctions between different types of hunting and the characteristics of different 
types of hunters.    
 
Contextualizing Hunting: Sport versus Tradition 
Separate from traditional, in the sense of socially accepted, animal harm 
practices, some forms of animal harm are an integral part of cultural and ethnic 
identity, particularly hunting activities more or less integral to rural lifestyles [12, 13]. 
Rollin suggests that the closest society has come to an ethical position on the 
treatment of animals is to not be cruel ‘which essentially enjoins us not to 
maliciously, willfully or sadistically hurt animals for no purpose’ [14]. Contemporary 
species justice and animal rights concerns highlight a difference between the views of 
rural and countryside dwellers who have historically engaged in traditional forms of 
sport or recreation where killing of animals is acceptable and specific ‘rural’ notions 
of crime may exist [15,16]. The environmental radicalism of town-dwellers is 
however contributing to the view of many such practices, such as hunting wild 
animals, as being increasingly problematic [17]. To be sure, in many countries, 
traditional hunting, shooting, and fishing activities (often defined as fieldsports) are 
predominantly lawful. But over the years, a number of activities, such as hunting with 
dogs, animal baiting, and the taking of specific species considered to be endangered 
or with vulnerable populations, have been criminalized commensurate with legal 
definitions that implement dominant social norms and values by characterizing certain 
hunting activities as socially unacceptable.  In some cases, activities such as animal 
baiting and fighting continue as underground ‘sports’ despite their illegality, while the 
killing of protected wildlife by hunting communities also represents a contemporary 
wildlife protection issue [13,18]. Some traditional hunting activity also exists in areas 
where hunting and its associated activities are carried out for subsistence purposes, 
particularly in respect of indigenous peoples [19]. In some cases such activities also 
have a traditional social meaning where groups of rural dwellers participate in the 
activity as a social gathering. Where this is done unlawfully (i.e. in contravention of 
regulations) it amounts to poaching [20], the illegal taking of wildlife or game animals 
for food. Nonetheless, the underlying legality of some fieldsports-related activity does 
not negate the illegality inherent in or associated with illegal hunting where 
regulations are disregarded whether deliberately or accidentally.  
 
For the purposes of this article, hunting is defined largely by its legal classification 
and is differentiated from sport and trophy hunting which is primarily motivated by 
dominion over rare species and also linked to the illegal trade in animal derivatives 
such as ivory [21, 22]. Hunting as defined by this article  includes ‘traditional’ 
hunting, shooting and fishing practices carried out by countryside or rural community 
dwellers rather than the subsistence hunting of indigenous peoples carried out 
specifically as an integral part of their cultural identity [23]. However, in addition to 
the (mainly British) definition of fieldsports as being country sports or blood sports, 
this article’s definition of hunting also includes hunting carried out by rural 
communities which has a social connotation. Thus this article's definition of hunting 
includes game shooting in rural areas of Europe, the UK and the United States and 
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both commercial and traditional (rather than recreational) fishing. Traditional large 
carnivore hunting such as hunting with dogs specialized to lynx or brown bear 
hunting in Northern Eurasia would be another example [24]. Eliason [13] defined 
hunting as performing a traditional role, where the game taken is used and wastage is 
‘negatively sanctioned’. Bear hunting within the Nordic tradition, for example, 
considers the brown bear as valued game for its meat and other body parts, but also as 
a safety threat, or as vermin so that hunting arguable serves several purposes; keeping 
traditions alive, controlling population numbers and Eliason's notion of legitimate use 
of the animal [13]. Eliason's definition identifies hunting (and hunting as a fieldsport) 
as being primarily based around the ‘pursuit’ of live quarry and representing a way of 
life where individuals kill animals primarily for the purpose of using them for food or 
fur [25]. Thus hunters trap and kill animals in order to harvest their meat as food (e.g. 
bear), or to use their fur (e.g. lynx, bear) for clothing and shelter, anglers catch fish 
primarily for food, and farmers and others (including animal breeders) may kill 
predatory animals such as wolves, lynx and foxes in order to protect livestock or for 
retaliation.  Hunting may also be carried out to preserve hunting dog culture and as a 
social activity.
2
 
 
These distinctions are important because the hunting legislation at the subject of this 
article’s discussion of the ‘right to hunt’ makes a distinction between subsistence 
hunting on the one hand and hunting as either recreational pastime or as a form of 
predator control on the other hand Additionally,legal arguments raised on behalf of 
hunters make some distinctions between different types of activity. For 
one,international human rights law explicitly recognizes some forms of hunting as a 
form of cultural self-expression at odds with accepted notions of animal abuse as 
inherently criminal or evil, reflecting different cultural notions concerning the 
acceptability of animal killing [23]. Thus, international human rights law recognizes 
such difference via its incorporation and classification of the rights of indigenous 
peoples into a framework of exemptions from certain legislative provisions. 
Specifically, human rights law provides land rights and rights of cultural preservation 
that sometimes recognizes that indigenous peoples should be exempt from the 
confines of animal protection laws where exemptions are considered necessary to give 
effect to cultural self-preservation and expression [26,27].  As a consequence, some 
indigenous peoples are allowed to continue with traditional hunting practices that 
would otherwise be deemed unlawful.  
 
A significant cause of animal harm in fieldsports is masculinities [28,29], allied to the 
development of a hunting subculture where issues of power, dominance and control 
predominate and influence anthropocentric attitudes towards animals as existing 
primarily for human benefit [30, 7, 31]. Traditional countryside activities such as 
hunting with dogs in the UK, e.g. fox-hunting, mink-hunting, cub-hunting and stag-
hunting, and the killing of large carnivores in Europe are frequently an assertion of a 
particular form of social identity and hunting culture [12,11]. As a result, despite the 
existence of anti-hunting legislation in different parts of the world there remains 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that in a wider context there are discussions that consider some fluidity between 
different types of hunters and hunting activity [50]. However, this article's focus is criminological and 
legal classifications predicated primarily on the behaviours involved and how they are  defined by legal 
systems.  Particularly in respect of the hunting outlawed by the UK's Hunting Act 2004, both sides of 
the debate seemingly acknowledged hunting as a specific activity with defined characteristics. As this 
article discusses, the courts also make distinctions between different types of hunting and hunter. 
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resistance to law enforcement efforts which are rooted in cultural and traditional 
explanations for these activities that attempt to retain such activities in the face of 
perceived outsider threats [32, 33]. Sometimes this is presented as the ‘town versus 
country’ and attempts to negate the legitimacy of any legal interference, or is 
exhibited in arguments about the thrill of the chase and the concept of a ‘fair chase’ 
which is enjoyed by hunter and hunted alike.  
 
But it also reveals a ‘gang’ culture and group mentality. This is sometimes manifest in 
the use of Sykes and Matza’s [34] neutralization techniques where the legitimacy of 
legislation is contested or attempts are made to condemn the condemners and 
emphasize their lack of understanding of urban ways of life.  Hunting activities such 
as fox-, stag- and mink-hunting (which were all until recently lawful in the UK) have 
developed from their perceived ‘pest’ control origins into leisure pursuits, today as 
much about the sporting connotations of chasing live quarry with hounds as they are 
about population control of perceived pests. Cohn and Linzey define hunting as 
‘socially condoned cruelty’, arguing that the classification of some species as game is 
‘arbitrary and thus morally arbitrary’ [35]. While the focus of their analysis is official 
classifications of game, the unofficial classification of ‘game’ and ‘pests’ adopted by 
those involved in illegal activity also requires consideration.  
 
Cohn and Linzey suggest that the official classification of species as game refers to 
‘specific species that somehow are incapable of suffering’ or that any suffering 
involved was ‘necessary’ [35]. Implicit in their criticism is the notion that 
anthropocentric notions of animals exist and that the killing or suffering of animals 
takes place irrespective of whether there are sound pest control or conservation 
reasons for doing so.  This notion of deficient moral culpability has been employed 
according to the social legal perspective on animal harm [12, 9] where NGOs and 
policymakers attempt to censure an activity considered as morally wrong and which 
should not be allowed to continue [13]. In particular, anti-hunting discourse questions 
the morality of inflicting pain and suffering on animals and decisions to kill or take 
them for the purpose of ‘sport’. The long running UK campaign to ban hunting with 
dogs in (coordinated by the League Against Cruel Sports [LACS] over more than 60 
years) was primarily based on discussions concerning whether it was right to chase 
and terrify animals if the intention of activities such as fox-hunting was predator 
control. LACS argued that the purpose of such activities was primarily sport and thus 
this represented a form of animal harm that should be prohibited by legislation [12]. 
Hunt supporters argued both that hunting with hounds was, in the case of foxes at 
least, not only a form of predator control but also a traditional countryside recreational 
activity enjoyed by a range of individuals. Accordingly, they resisted attempts at 
legislative control, arguing for the necessity of fox hunting as a form of predator 
control [36]. 
 
Such discussions illustrate that while some hunting is traditional countryside 
activity carried out for subsistence and game management purposes, the target of 
contemporary anti-hunting legislation is conservation of species and the prohibition of 
hunting activities considered to be cruel and contrary to contemporary perspectives on 
animal control and conservation. Some hunting is, therefore, classified as ‘sport’ 
rather than as necessary conservation, wildlife management, or predator control 
activity. This has a bearing on both its justifiability and the extent to which it may be 
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interfered with by legislative systems.  This is particularly the case in respect of 
European human rights mechanisms discussed further below.   
 
The Legitimacy of Hunting Restrictions 
From a socio-cultural perspective, restrictions on hunting arguably lack legitimacy 
where conflict exists between rural dwellers and urban legislatures such that anti-
hunting legislation imposes an urban viewpoint on a rural populace [37].  However, 
international law provides nation states with various obligations to conserve natural 
resources, and states are entitled to decide that wildlife should be conserved in the 
public interest even where to do so arguably restricts the rights of citizens.  
Historically wild animals were seen as a res nullius public property, or the property of 
‘no one’ [38]. This raises complex arguments about the rights of citizens to claim 
compensation for losses caused by wildlife. One the one hand, states such as the US 
and Canada have refused to grant damages against the state on the grounds that the 
risks and losses caused by predatory wildlife are part of nature, indeed a ‘condition of 
the land’, as US law holds [39].  On the other hand, arguments have been raised that 
by protecting the damage causing species, the state has removed the 'natural' right of 
people to defend themselves against this risk [40]. Thus the state should be liable for 
losses caused by protected species.  
 
However, as Schaffner identifies, as law has developed in most countries ‘wild 
animals fell into the common class, meaning they belonged in common to all citizens’ 
[41]sometimes referred to as res communis.  This distinction is integral to 
understanding the restrictive nature of wildlife and game laws. Weston and Bollier 
identify that according to Locke’s notion of res nullius, ‘such resources belong to no 
one and are therefore free for the taking’[8].  Thus, theoretically, although some 
wildlife might be protected by law, it could become subject to people exerting 
property rights over wildlife on or neighbouring their land or might simply be deemed 
a public resource capable of being exploited by anyone in the absence of any law to 
the contrary.  However, national wildlife laws incorporate the notion of wildlife as 
something that should be preserved for the public good and held in trust for future 
generations [5].  Thus natural resource law has historically determined that the rights 
of man to take wildlife ‘may be restrained for reasons of state or for the supposed 
benefit of the community’ (Blackstone’s commentaries: 410).  The US Supreme Court 
recognised this principle in Geer v Connecticut, 161 U.S. (1896) a case concerning a 
Connecticut statute regulating game bird hunting where the appellant argued that the 
state lacked the power to make such a regulation.  The Supreme Court, however, ruled 
that states had the power to control and regulate game ‘as a trust for the benefit of the 
people’ and specifically noted wildlife as being in ‘common ownership’ by the 
citizens of the state. The Court's decision thus established the ‘wildlife trust’ doctrine 
which subsequent court decisions have upheld by allowing states to conserve and 
protect wildlife even where their right to do so has been challenged. For example, 
Hughes v Oklahoma 441 U.S. (1979) which, while overruling Geer on the question of 
whether a state could actually ‘own’ wildlife, expressly confirmed that US states 
could implement in law their legitimate concerns over the need to conserve and 
protect wild animals within their borders.   
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The decision in Geer reflects the fact that most US states had enacted some form of 
wildlife protection legislation and, in a contemporary setting, states (and States) have 
developed wildlife and conservation laws to reflect the changing needs of wildlife 
protection and the public interest in seeing wildlife protected. Thus, when the US 
enacted the Endangered Species Act 1973, it did so recognizing that various species 
of wildlife had been rendered extinct and others needed protection.  Weston and 
Bollier state that the law formally recognized the value of fish, wildlife and plant 
species to the US and its people and that subsequently ‘the U.S government has also 
pledged through various international agreements, to conserve endangered species’ 
[8].  This position is broadly replicated across the 181 countries that are currently 
signatories to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) and who consider that endangered wildlife should be 
protected by national and international law. It is also reflected in EU wildlife 
protection law and policy which paternalistically imposes a duty on EU Member 
States to conserve wildlife and to impose criminal sanctions on those committing 
serious breaches of environmental law.
3
  
 
Wildlife protection is thus now accepted as an issue on which Governments legislate 
in the public interest and implement the notion of wildlife trust as integral to animal 
protection. National wildlife law develops and is often interpreted in the context of the 
prevailing social conditions and the manner in which society socially constructs the 
public interest and wildlife trust doctrines. Thus these doctrines may expand to cover 
a wider range of wildlife protection concerns as wildlife populations are affected or 
threatened by both natural and human threats, including depletion of species by 
hunting.  For example, in Barrett v. State 116 NE. (N.Y.1917) a US court considered 
a claim against a statute on the grounds that: it protected a destructive animal (the 
beaver) that was causing timber damage; that the prohibition on molesting beavers 
prevented people from protecting their property and so was an unreasonable exercise 
of state police powers; and that the state as owner or possessor of the beavers was 
liable for the damage they caused.  The court concluded that the state was entitled to 
exercise its police powers wherever the public interest demanded it, and by upholding 
the state legislature’s authority to enact the statute which also specified that no person 
could molest or disturb a wild beaver or its ‘dams, houses, homes or abiding places’, 
also confirmed that wildlife legislation could protect not only the animal itself, but 
also animal habitats.  Similar provisions exist in other wildlife legislation such as the 
EC Birds Directive and the UK’s Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 which creates 
offences in relation to ‘disturbing’ wild birds at or near their nests and to actual nest 
destruction whilst in use or being built.  These reflect the reality of wildlife habitat 
destruction by economic development and increased human encroachment on wild 
areas. The importance given to wildlife protection also develops as social concerns 
turn towards environmental issues and animal protection.  For example since at least 
the early 20
th
 century and Re Wedgwood, Allen v Wedgwood [1915] 1 CH 113, a case 
in which the UK courts accepted the benefit to society from animal welfare; a social 
context has existed in which animal protection has been enhanced rather than 
diminished through the development of animal welfare law and the growth of the 
animal welfare and environmentalist movements. EU law also adopts this principle, 
recognising that animals, as sentient beings, are deserving of protection. Thus a 
balancing act sometimes exists between the conflicting priorities of human and animal 
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 See, for example, Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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interests, requiring some delicate deliberations on where and when human activities 
need to be curtailed. Applied to European hunting activities, courts may well need to 
balance the interests of hunting communities against the interests of wildlife 
protection. These are sometimes complex legal (rather than ethical or moral) 
decisions, as the following discussion illustrates.  
 
The United Kingdom’s Hunting Act 2004 
Within the UK, hunting is a traditional activity, although arguably the British 
conception of hunting differs considerably from the European context. For example, 
the UK does not have large carnivore populations (e.g. brown bear, lynx) and is thus 
not subject to precisely the same conservation and hunting dog cultural issues 
experienced by other European countries. Cooper [11] also notes that in the UK 
'traditionally, at least, hunting has been associated with the ruling or elite classes, as a 
means of exerting primacy and influence'.  However plural forms of hunting exist in 
the UK; sport hunting; commercial hunting and recreational hunting. Sport hunting, 
the chasing of animals for sport, has historically been legal in the UK and consists of 
a number of activities with fox-hunting perhaps the most well known (discussed 
further below).  But other types such as hare coursing have also existed and illegal 
types of 'sport', such as badger baiting and badger digging, also continue despite 
having been made illegal through wildlife protection and animal welfare laws in the 
1980s and 1990s [42]. Thus arguably legal and illegal forms of hunting have existed 
side by side and claims of illegal cruelty as being endemic in sporting practices have 
been integral to campaigns to ban sport hunting and the attention of green 
criminologists employing a species justice perspective.   
 
Previous research [12, 29] identifies that offenders involved in the exploitation of 
wildlife, farm animals or the rural environment within traditional fieldsports, can 
commit their crimes for the following general reasons: 
 
1. profit or commercial gain; 
2. thrill or sport; 
3. necessity of obtaining food; 
4. antipathy towards governmental and law enforcement bodies; 
5. tradition and cultural reasons. 
 
While these are the primary motivations and others may be involved, certain specific 
types of offending can only take place in rural areas as they are inherently reliant on 
countryside and wild species (e.g. hare coursing, badger-baiting, illegal fox-hunting 
and bushmeat hunting). The UK, through its Hunting Act 2004, sought to ban the 
traditional practice of hunting with dogs, while separate legislation (the Protection of 
Mammals [Scotland] Act 2002) banned the practice in Scotland. Hunting in the UK 
is, however, a primarily social or recreational activity rather than the culturally 
ingrained hunting of several European countries who have communities living in 
close proximity to large carnivores such as wolves, lynx and bear. Hunting with dogs 
and specifically fox-hunting are long-standing UK countryside practices associated 
with debates around class and, in particular, the right of the middle and upper classes 
to hunt with dogs. Fox-hunting has particular social connotations and is inextricably 
linked with the British concept of a right to enjoy and use the countryside and to 
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exercise freedom to enjoy particular pursuits. Legislation aimed at banning the 
practice thus raised controversial social issues relating to the treatment of animals and 
the imposition of legislation by one group on another. The Hunting Act 2004, for 
example, was introduced by a Labour (socialist) government and was perceived by 
some as an attack by a liberal town-dwelling elite on a marginalised rural population 
[36]. The specific legal and moral issue of whether there is a ‘right’ for humans to 
hunt non-human animals, whether this right should be protected by law or whether 
parliament could legitimately interfere with such a right in the public interest (widely 
construed) also became a matter of debate. The proponents of (mainly) fox-hunting 
sought to clarify this issue through a serious of legal challenges which invoked the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular the notions that 
hunting fell within Article 8, the right to a private life, Article 11 the right of freedom 
of association and assembly, and Article 14 freedom of discrimination. 
An initial challenge to the Hunting Act 2004 on the grounds that it was invalid 
because it had been passed by the House of Commons using the Parliament Acts 1911 
and 1949 to force the legislation through despite the disagreement of the House of 
Lords failed. This argument rested on a technical point in UK constitutional law 
which generally requires both Houses to agree on legislation [43], rather than on the 
specific merits of state interference with hunting.
4
 But the failure of the ‘legal 
validity’ challenge was followed by attempts to challenge the Act on human rights 
grounds as an interference in the ‘right’ to hunt which hunt proponents argued existed 
under the grounds outlined above. In R (Countryside Alliance and others) v. Attorney 
General [2007] UKHL 52, the House of Lords was asked to consider the 
compatibility of the ban on hunting with hounds with the alleged right of hunters to 
continue with the activity. Most human rights guaranteed under the European 
Convention can be interfered with where the interference is considered necessary, 
serves a legitimate purpose, and is proscribed by law. The Hunting Act 2004 raised 
the question of whether public opinion or prevailing morality were considered 
sufficient grounds to restrict an activity. In effect, the Act raised the question of 
whether public opposition to hunting justified the UK parliament in passing a law 
which prevented a group of individuals from carrying out a particular activity that had 
previously been lawful, especially where for some individuals (those employed 
professionally within the countryside with employment directly linked to or 
dependent on hunting) the law would have a direct effect on their livelihoods. While 
space does not permit detailed discussion of UK constitutional law, the challenges to 
the legitimacy of the Hunting Act 2004 failed in the UK courts in part because the 
House of Commons, the elected chamber, was deemed to have the right to push 
through legislation it considered appropriate to restrict a practice (fox hunting) that 
the public generally disapproved of  (discussed further below).
5
 
                                                 
4
 The House of Commons is the elected main chamber, the House of Lords is an unelected upper 
chamber whose powers to delay and scrutinize legislation are a vital part of the legislative process. But 
in reality the Lords' powers are limited and a constitutional principle exists that the Lords should not 
'block' Government legislation.  
5
 Arguably the reasons why the public disapprove of hunting are of limited relevance it is the 
legitimacy of the Government action that is at issue.  Indeed in July 2015 a Conservative majority 
Government, that largely believes hunting is a choice issue rather than an animal protection or wildlife 
law one, failed in its attempts to amend/repeal the Hunting Act 2004. Parliamentary arithmetic and 
widespread public protest suggested that the Government lacked the required support and 
parliamentary votes needed to change the law. 
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European Human Rights Law and Hunting 
As this article identifies; challenges to the UK’s Hunting Act 2004 primarily engaged 
the private life, freedom of assembly and anti-discrimination aspects of the ECHR. 
While the UK hunting ban relates primarily to a specific legal situation and conflict of 
interest within the UK's particular hunting context and culture, it is of relevance in a 
wider European context.  First, a number of European countries have legal systems 
similar to that of the UK, thus the precedence established by UK cases is of interest in 
identifying how other European legal systems may deal with challenges to anti-
hunting legislation.  Secondly, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) are applicable to all 47 Council of Europe states, noting that the ECHR is 
not an EU measure but a wider European one.  Thus, the challenges to UK law were 
ultimately decided by judges considering hunting in a Europe-wide context which 
included drawing direct parallels between the claims for protection of their activity 
made by UK hunters, and claims made by hunting proponents and opponents in other 
European states. Thus while in one sense, the cases discussed identify how hunting is 
defined and is being problematized within the UK, some important social and political 
lessons are also identified in respect of wider European conceptions on hunting. 
Indeed, these also raise the issue of the extent to which European governments can 
interfere with traditional and cultural conceptions on hunting. 
 
While space does not permit exhaustive discourse on the nature of the ECHR, a brief 
explanation of the ECHR's provisions in respect of challenges to the Hunting Act 
2004 is necessary. 
 
Article 8 of the ECHR states that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
Article 11 of the ECHR states that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests. 
 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of 
the police or of the administration of the State. 
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Article 14 of the ECHR states that: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
The wording of the ECHR makes clear that these are qualified rather than absolute 
rights [44]; thus they can be interfered with by the state for a variety of reasons as 
long as any interference is considered to be necessary, proportionate and carried out 
for a legitimate purpose.  These qualifiers were the subject of considerable debate and 
legal argument as the following sections illustrate. 
 
Hunting and the Right to Private Life 
In Friend v the United Kingdom and The Countryside Alliance and Others v the 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR was effectively asked to consider whether the UK’s 
hunting ban represented an interference with hunters’ private lives.  The matter had 
previously been considered by the UK's House of Lords
6
 where the Lords determined 
that hunting was not a traditional culture and lifestyle that was so fundamental to a 
group (hunters) that it formed part of their identity and required legal protection. The 
House of Lords concluded that fox-hunting was a public activity and so the question 
of personal autonomy which underlay the right to respect for private life was not 
engaged.  In Friend and The Countryside Alliance cases, hunters and their 
representatives argued that the concept of a private life ‘was not limited to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy nor was it prevented from operating in a public 
context’ (para 36 of the judgment).  They argued that while not all activities a person 
chose to undertake fell within the scope of Article 8, for those for whom hunting was 
a core or central part of their lives anti-hunting laws interfered with their personal 
autonomy and also had a negative impact on their community and cultural lifestyle.  
Friend (the first applicant) argued that ‘the hunting community was in fact an ethnic 
or national minority, which had evolved through the long history of hunting, with its 
own traditions, rituals and culture or was at least a cultural way of life’.  Thus, states 
who were a party to the ECtHR had an obligation to facilitate such a way of life and 
to preserve cultural diversity. The second applicants argued that the effect of a ban on 
hunting also interfered with use of their land and homes and thus was an interference 
in their private lives.  Given that hunting took place over their land and they rented 
accommodation connected with hunting, it was claimed that the ban on hunting could 
result in them losing their homes and livelihoods. 
 
The ECtHR dismissed these arguments.  It concluded that while hunting wild 
mammals had a long history in the UK and had even become part of the fabric and 
heritage of rural communities where it was practised, it remained a public activity 
rather than one inextricably linked to one's private life. The ECtHR also rejected the 
idea that the hunting community was a national or ethnic minority of a kind whose 
activities required protected.  The ECtHR specifically noted that mere participation in 
a common social activity, without something more, cannot create membership of a 
national or ethnic minority (discussed further below). 
                                                 
6
  The case predates the setting up of the UK Supreme Court, thus at the time the House of 
Lords was the highest UK court. 
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Hunting and Freedom of Assembly 
The Article 11 concerns of hunters claimed that bans on hunting and anti-hunting 
legislation interfere with their right of freedom of assembly.  In Friend it was broadly 
accepted by hunters that the Hunting Act 2004 and the Protection of Mammals 
(Scotland) 2002 Act did not interfere with the right to associate or assemble with the 
Hunt, but it was argued that by banning the Hunt from hunting with hounds, the right 
was ‘emasculated’ because it prohibited the Hunt’s raison d’etre and therefore the 
very reason for assembly.  Thus, the argument drew on previous case law (Anderson 
v. the United Kingdom no. 33689/96, Commission decision of 27 October 1997) to 
provide authority for an argument that the right to associate carried with it the right to 
do so for a particular purpose, namely hunting.  
 
Restricting hunters from gathering together for their preferred purpose of hunting with 
dogs arguably raises the question of the extent to which the state can interfere with the 
right of interest group members, in this case hunters, to gather together. The Anderson 
case determines that individuals’ right to gather together in order to attain various 
ends should be protected. But, the Commission concluded that ‘there was no 
indication that freedom of assembly was intended to guarantee a right to assemble for 
purely social purposes anywhere one wished’ (para 49 of the decision in Friend, the 
Countryside Alliance and Others v the United Kingdom). The ECtHR concluded that 
the intention of Article 11 was to protect the right to peaceful demonstration and to 
participate in the democratic process. The Article has been used, for example, to 
protect the right of assembly of trade unions and political parties to engage in peaceful 
assembly [44, 26].  However, while the ECtHR conceded that Article 11 could extend 
to protection of assemblies of a purely social character, it argued that the ban on 
hunting did not prevent the right of assembly per se, notwithstanding the fact that the 
act behind the assembly (hunting) was being prevented. The ECtHR concluded: 
 
The hunting bans only prevent a hunt from gathering for the particular purpose 
of killing a wild mammal with hounds; as such, the hunting bans restrict not 
the right of assembly but a particular activity for which huntsmen assemble.  
The hunt remains free to engage in any one of a number of alternatives to 
hunting such as drag or trail hunting. 
(para 50 of the decision in Friend, the Countryside Alliance and Others v the 
United Kingdom) 
 
The ECtHR further concluded that even if the hunting ban was considered an 
interference with a right of freedom of assembly, the ban was justified as being 
lawful, in the sense of being the subject of appropriately passed law.  In addition the 
ECtHR concluded that the bans brought about by the Hunting Act 2004 served the 
legitimate aim of ‘protection of morals’ allowed for under the ECHR.  The ECtHR 
concluded that such laws were legitimate ‘in the sense that they were designed to 
eliminate the hunting and killing of animals for sport in a manner which the 
legislature judged to cause suffering and to be morally and ethically objectionable’ 
(para 50 of the judgment.) In respect of the question of necessity and proportionality 
the ECtHR concluded that: 
 
by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
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international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those moral and 
ethical restrictions as well as on the ‘necessity' of a 'restriction' intended to 
meet them. Furthermore a wider margin of appreciation must be accorded to 
State authorities in regulating a particular assembly the further that assembly 
moves from one of a political character to one of a purely social character. 
 
In a wider European context, hunters would not be prevented from being members of 
a hunting association or from carrying out legitimate predator control. But, the cases 
make clear that it is for the state to decide, first,what activities can and cannot be 
carried out and, second, the extent to which activities can be restricted.  In some 
respects, the arguments for hunting with dogs as a form of sport worked against hunt 
enthusiasts. This was because the ECtHR concluded that the hunting activity ofriding 
to hounds and the social gathering and competition of the hunt could be carried out 
without the element of animal killing that the law sought to ban.  Indeed, hunting 
could be carried by following a false trail rather than pursuing an actual animal, and 
legitimate predator control could still be carried out through other means such as 
shooting 'pest' animals. Thus the interference with certain rights is arguably minimal 
and proportionate because the law does not constitute an outright ban on hunting 
activities nor does it ban necessary predator control that protects livelihoods and 
farming interests. 
 
Anti-Hunting Law as Discrimination 
The complaints made by UK hunters and their representatives under Article 14 were 
dismissed by the ECtHR in Friend, the Countryside Alliance and Others v the United 
Kingdom but are worth exploring in respect of questions that hunters are being 
persecuted by anti-hunting legislation. The question of discrimination and Article 14 
was considered by the UK Court of Appeal which concluded that Article 14 could not 
apply because fox hunting was considered to be a common activity engaged in by a 
heterogeneous group of individuals.  When considered by the UK’s House of Lords, 
the Article 14 claims were dismissed because the applicants were not considered to 
have any characteristics that could be described as an ‘other status’ under that Article. 
 
Arguably in the European law context, hunters are not accepted as being a distinct 
group of ethnic, national or ‘other’ status that requires protection under international 
law.  Accordingly they have no specific characteristics that are being discriminated 
against by banning them from hunting and are, legally, the same as any other group 
whose activities are regulated by the state despite their opposition.  Indeed later in 
Herrmann v Germany (application no.9300/07 decision of 26 June 2012) the ECtHR 
considered a complaint that compulsory membership of a hunting association and an 
obligation to tolerate hunting on his property violated the rights of an applicant who 
was ethically opposed to hunting. This case raised Article 14, Article 9 and Article 11 
issues and confirmed the widespread social reality of hunting; underlining its status as 
a public activity rather than one integral to a specific subculture or distinct subgroup 
of society.  The [then] German Federal Hunting Act in this case made all owners of 
hunting grounds with a surface area of less than 75 hectares de jure members of a 
hunting association and the hunting authority’s rejection of the applicant’s request to 
terminate his membership of the association on the grounds of his opposition to 
hunting ultimately led to his claim before the ECtHR. 
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These cases illustrate that while hunting may be indicative of certain characteristics 
and behaviours that individuals may wish to claim as being a necessary part of their 
private and cultural lives, the law (or at least European law) does not generally 
recognize a distinct right to hunt except in the particular case of indigenous peoples or 
others constituting a distinct ethnic minority (discussed further below). Crucially it 
also endorses the view that state authorities can intervene in hunting activities on 
moral grounds where considered necessary (by the state) to do so. The state can base 
its legislation on the judgment of elected representatives and legislative authorities 
that such activities should be restricted in order to protect public morals. The moral 
imperative of outlawing animal harm [12], while being a matter of judgment that 
might be disputed by some, clearly is one that public authorities are entitled to take 
into account as forming a valid basis for legislation. The ECtHR explicitly observed 
this by noting that the hunting ban was introduced 'after extensive debate by the 
democratically-elected representatives of the State on the social and ethical issues 
raised by the method of hunting in question' (para 50 of Friend). The ECtHR also 
observed that 
 
 ...the 2004 Act was preceded by extensive public debate, including the 
 hearings conducted by the Burns Committee.  It was enacted by the House of 
 Commons after equally extensive debate in Parliament where various 
 proposals were considered before an outright ban was accepted. In those 
 circumstances, the Court is unable to accept that the House of Commons was 
 not entitled to legislate as it did or that the refusal of the Burns report to draw 
 any conclusions as to the suffering of animals during hunting substantially 
 undermined the reasons for the 2004 Act. The judgment that it was in the 
 public interest to ban hunting was, as Lord Hope observed in the context of the 
 proportionality of the hunting ban in Scotland, pre-eminently one for the 
 House of Commons to make. 
 (Para 56 of Friend, The Countryside Alliance and Others v The United 
Kingdom) 
 
The ECtHR's judgment drew on its previous case law in relation to hunting in other 
countries (and contexts) and how it defined ethnic groups/subcultures and property 
rights in other contexts.  Thus its approach, while based in assessing a country-
specific problem, examines the issue of hunting within a European context. 
Accordingly, its judgment touches on the principle that democratically elected 
governments are entitled to outlaw certain animal harm activities even where 
dissenting voices exist.  Crucially, by implication it identifies that the public interest 
can be well served by decisions that implement the public good. Such wildlife trust 
doctrines and contemporary perspectives on animal welfare partially reflect 
Donaldson and Kymlicka's [45] notion that wild animals are also deserving of some 
form of rights, in this case in the form of protection from unnecessary harm.  
 
Illegal Hunting Resistance and the perception of a right to hunt. 
The decisions of the ECtHR on challenges to the UK’s Hunting Act 2004 clarify the 
perception that hunters may have a right to hunt that exists based on the existence of 
hunting communities and traditional participation in hunting within particular 
communities. The ECtHR clearly distinguishes between hunting as a subsistence 
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necessity and hunting as a predominantly social or recreational activity, even in those 
farming and rural communities where hunting might be considered an integral aspect 
of the rural way of life [12, 13].  The ECtHR endorses the right of legislatures in 
contemporary western societies to prohibit sporting and traditional activities that harm 
animals as unacceptable and unlawful, even though to do so may frustrate 
communities both culturally and socially. While, in the UK at least, the majority do 
not hunt or carry out animal harming recreational activities, those that do represent a 
vocal minority. Protests against the introduction of the UK’s Hunting Act 2004 were 
widespread with the major protest attracting around 400,000 people, many of whom 
initially vowed to carry on the activity after the law made hunting with dogs unlawful. 
Cooper suggests that ‘the obvious inference is that those individuals were prepared to 
become offenders’ [11]. The numbers also indicate that the hunting/shooting 
community is sufficiently large to be classed as a distinct social group or subculture, 
albeit not one that might be legally recognized as such. 
 
Similarly, in Europe, resistance to anti-hunting legislation and to the criminalization 
of certain hunting practices has resulted in resistance [33]. Despite legislation in 
various parts of the world that makes much traditional fieldsports activity either 
unlawful or places strict controls on what may be carried out, illegal fieldsports 
activity and unlawful predator control in the name of hunting and farming interests 
continues in a number of countries. In the UK in particular (and to a certain extent 
also in the United States) animal harm linked to the activities of economic offenders 
[12] continues, especially where protected animals are killed in support of traditional 
fieldsports activities which have now become commercialized. In these cases the 
perceived economic benefits of predatory and large carnivore animal killing, in terms 
of increased animal stocks for commercial exploitation, outweigh the available legal 
sanctions such that offenders have a strong motivation to commit their animal harm. 
European Human Rights Law and Hunting: A Green Criminological View 
Skidelski [46] argues that 'a law supported by a majority will still be considered 
illegitimate by a minority if it lacks moral or rational justification', further suggesting 
that the pro-ban argument of the UK Hunting Act 2004 was based on prejudice.  
However, what the ECtHR cases achieve is underlining the legitimacy of animal 
protection laws as endorsing societal and Europe-wide ideals on wildlife protection, 
even where these impact on 'minority', or vocal majority, interests.  While there are 
undoubtedly conflicts between hunting and wildlife protection interests, the ECtHR is 
clearly saying that the 'right to hunt' is, at best, narrowly construed.  In doing so, its 
conception on the necessity of hunting is also a narrow one indicating that hunting 
and wildlife management issues are not immune to regulation.  Thus while those who 
continue to hunt illegally may identify themselves as resisting an 'unjust' law, they fall 
foul of socio-legal perspectives which define crime as being that defined as such by 
the criminal law [47]. Thus offenders are those who breach the law irrespective of the 
moral dimensions of their claim against the legitimacy and necessity of the law [34]. 
 
The reality of illegal hunting thus becomes one in which the killing of protected 
wildlife, even that wildlife considered socially and culturally to be 'fair game' in a 
local setting, is one of wildlife crime [12]. Both species justice concerns, and 
mainstream criminological ones would argue that such rational-thinking individuals 
[48] who choose to hunt illegally and kill protected wildlife, should be the subject of 
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criminal justice attention even where arguments about interference with traditional 
activities might be raised. Accordingly, resistance against anti-hunting legislation 
through continued illegal hunting is itself denied legitimacy on human rights and 
species justice grounds. Even though in some European countries hunting may be 
socially accepted activity such that it represents a significant part of the culture and is 
perceived as a way of life, the right to hunt is extremely limited.  Arguably the 
ECtHR's judgments are consistent with a species justice perspective that considers 
that justice systems need to consider the needs of all victims of crime not just human 
ones [5, 10]. From a critical criminological perspective, the ECtHR's decisions 
illustrate how deviance such as illegal killing of wildlife can (and should) be the 
interest of more than just criminal law consideration.  Scrutiny by the ECtHR has 
clarified the legitimacy of laws in this important area of wildlife protection.   
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